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 1. Introduction 
 
States impose many restrictions on the taxing powers of local governments.  Best known 
are the property tax limits imposed by popular referenda in California and Massachusetts.  
These are only the tip of the iceberg, however.  Forty-six of the states place some form of 
restriction on local property taxes, with more than half setting a limit on the property tax 
rate that municipalities may impose.1  In addition to setting upper limits on local tax 
rates, states also limit the instruments that localities are permitted to use.  Local 
governments are creatures of state governments and may use only tax instruments 
authorized by their state governments.  For instance, in most states, local governments are 
required to have authorization from the state legislature to impose an income or payroll 
tax.  That authorization usually dictates the form of the tax, the permissible range of rates, 
and the treatment of non-residents.  Only 16 states authorize some form of local income 
taxes, and only 8 have any municipalities that impose income taxes.2 
We study the political economy of state limitations on the taxing powers of local 
governments, investigating the effects of such restriction on housing markets, community 
composition, and the types of expenditures undertaken by local governments.  We find 
that tax limitations have substantial effects on housing prices and the composition of 
communities.  Adjustments following introduction of tax limits result in changes in 
median incomes in all communities.  The electorates of communities then adopt policies 
quite different from those that prevail in the absence of tax limitations.  Tax limits 
thereby have striking effects on spending.  Local expenditures on redistribution falls, and, 
                                                 
1 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1995(a), p. 23.   
2 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1988, and 1995(b), Table 20, pg. 70. 
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 in general, per capita expenditures on public good provision falls in all but possibly the 
richest communities. 
One objective of our analysis is to investigate political support for tax limitations.  It is 
clear that, in practice, limitations are by no means counter to the wishes of voters.  Voter-
supported initiatives such as Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2 ½ in 
Massachusetts attest to the popularity of tax limits.  This raises an apparent puzzle.  Why 
would voters support a state referendum to limit their local government’s taxing powers?  
One would expect local governments to be most responsive to voters, being the 
governments that are “closest to the people.”  Our results provide support for a 
fundamental insight of Vigdor (2001).  He offers the hypothesis that support for local tax 
limits comes not only from voters wishing to limit the taxes their own locality imposes, 
but also from the desire of voters to limit tax rates in localities in which they do not 
reside.  He observes that voters in one locality may wish to limit the tax rate in another 
locality because they would prefer to live in that locality if the tax rate there were lower.  
He presents a model with three voter types in which this motive for limiting state taxes 
leads to adoption of state tax limits.3  
We find in our model that two sets of voters support tax limitations. Some who support 
the limit will move if the limit is adopted. Others who do not anticipate relocating to 
another municipality also support tax limits.  The reason traces to the distortionary effects 
of high central-city taxes emphasized by Mieszkowski and Mills (1993). Tax limits have 
greatest bite in the central-city, where our model predicts that taxes will otherwise be 
highest.  Through reductions in the distortionary effects of central-city taxes, suburban 
                                                 
3 Other factors may play an key role as well. See Fishel (1989) and O’Sullivan, et. al. (1995) for alternative 
explanations for the popularity of California’s Proposition 13. 
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 residents benefit from tax limits.  Property tax limits cause net-of-tax housing prices to 
rise and gross-of-tax housing prices to fall in the poorer communities.  In wealthier 
communities property values may fall.  Despite the fact that most of the residents of 
wealthier suburbs are homeowners, most residents of these suburbs are better off with the 
tax limits.  Lower housing prices permit them to expand housing consumption, and the 
out-migration of lower-income households permits remaining residents to increase public 
good consumption per capita without increasing taxes.  These latter two effects offset the 
capital loss that those homeowners experience.  
Our analysis shows that, for understanding the effects of tax limits, it is essential to 
consider both public-good expenditures and redistributive expenditures.  In addition, to 
understand limitations on the set of tax instruments that municipalities are permitted to 
use, it is clearly necessary to consider more than one tax instrument.  Study of the 
political economy of tax and expenditure structure has been severely hampered by the 
well-known problem of potential non-existence of equilibrium when voting is over 
multidimensional choices (Plott, 1967).  Thus, the preponderance of work on modeling 
tax and expenditures presumes use of a given tax instrument and a given form of 
expenditure.  The voting problem is then reduced to a single dimension by imposition of 
the government budget constraint.  While this approach has led to a vast and rich body of 
research,4 it is too restrictive to permit study of choice among tax instruments and forms 
of expenditures.  Research studying higher-dimensional voting problems typically 
assumes that voters consider only a restricted set of choices on any given vote, with 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Westhoff, 1977, Goodspeed, 1989, Epple, Filimon, and Romer, 1984, Cassidy, Epple, 
and Romer, 1989, Ellickson, 1982, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996 and 1998, Calabrese, 2001, Epple and 
Romano, 2003. 
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 issues decided by multiple votes.5 It is increasingly difficult, however, to apply this 
approach as the dimensionality of voting problems increases—because arbitrary choices 
must then be made about which tradeoffs that are considered on a given vote.  The 
approach thus raises the concern that results may be sensitive to the tradeoffs that voters 
are presumed to consider when voting on a particular issue. 
A contribution of our work is study of choice of tax instruments in a framework in which 
voting equilibrium exists when voters consider all issues simultaneously.  In particular, 
we adopt a preference structure, consistent with empirical evidence on demand functions, 
for which equilibrium exists.  We study the equilibrium among local jurisdictions that 
emerges when localities are permitted use of two or more tax instruments.  We then 
investigate whether there will be majority support for state-level restrictions on local 
taxes, and we investigate the equilibrium that emerges when tax limits are imposed.  
While our primary focus is positive analysis of tax limits, we also undertake a welfare 
analysis of limits, finding that a large proportion of the population may gain from 
imposition of tax limits. The reduction in redistributive expenditure that follows adoption 
of tax limits reduces the welfare of the lowest-income households.  We find, however, 
that a relatively modest increase in redistribution at the state level can offset the welfare 
loss experienced by low-income households.  Thus, tax limits coupled with a modest 
increase in state aid to the poorest households can be Pareto improving.  
                                                 
5 Reducing the problem to a single dimension does not assure existence of voting equilibrium (Denzau and 
MacKay, 1981), but does permit use of familiar strategies for imposing conditions on model structure such 
that equilibrium exists. Nechyba (1997) provides a creative application of this approach, allowing separate 
votes over local and state tax rates. At the local level, where both income and property taxes may 
potentially be used, Nechyba gives a community planner responsibility for setting one instrument while 
voters choose the value of the other.  
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 As explained above, the distortionary effects of central-city taxes that arise in the absence 
of tax limits play an important role in our analysis.  Before turning to that analysis, it is 
useful to cite a particular instance.  Prior to the imposition of proposition 2 ½ in 
Massachusetts, the residential property tax rate in Boston was approximately 6.3% of 
property value. In thinking about the magnitude of this tax, it is useful to convert this 
value to a rate applied to the annual rental of housing services.  If we convert property 
values to annualized flow using rates on the order of 7% to 9%,6  the implied tax rate on 
annualized service flow is on the order of 70% (=6.3/.09) to 90%. Relative to sales tax 
rates typically observed on other commodities, this is an exceedingly high rate. In our 
model, we find a central-city tax rate of 77.6 on annualized service when there is not a 
property tax limit and local income tax is not used. 
 
2. Model and Properties 
The economy of the model consists of a continuum of households that differ only in their 
endowed income y.7 The distribution of income is represented by the continuous 
distribution f(y).  All households have the same preferences represented by utility 
function U(g,h,b), where g is expenditures on a publicly provided good, h is units of 
housing, and b is consumption of a numeraire bundle.  We first develop properties of 
equilibrium for the case in which all households are renters.  We then extend the results 
to the case of owner-occupants. 
                                                 
6 The user cost of housing net of property taxes (Poterba, 1992) is (1-ty)i+ζ where ty is the income tax rate, i 
is the nominal interest rate, and ζ is the sum of the risk premium on housing investments, maintenance, 
depreciation, and inflation. Let ty=.15 and, following Poterba,  let ζ=-.02 and i=.1286. The result is a rate of 
8.9% for converting property value to implicit net-of-property-tax rental rates. Using an income tax rate of 
.25, we obtain a rate of 7.5%. These calculations suggest conversion rates on the order of 7% to 9%. 
7 Assuming a single dimension of heterogeneity is restrictive. However, this simplification yields major 
benefits from the perspective of tractability while providing valuable insights about the effects of tax limits. 
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 There are multiple local communities that may differ in land area.  Each has a local 
government that may impose a proportional income tax, m, on the income of its residents, 
and an ad valorem property tax, t, on the value of housing in the jurisdiction.  Total tax 
revenue in each community may be used to finance expenditures on a publicly provided 
good, g, and a lump sum redistributive grant, r, to each individual in the community.  The 
tax rates, m and t, and expenditure levels, g and r, are determined by majority vote of 
residents of the locality.  Voting is conducted simultaneously on this set of variables.8 
A household with income y faces the following budget constraint if the household locates 
in a particular community, j: 
 (1 )j j jy m r p h b− + = +   
The gross-of-tax price per unit of housing is, jp .  We denote the net-of-tax price jhp .  
The following identity relates the gross- and net-of-tax prices: (1 )j j jhp p t≡ + . A 
household locates in the community with the tax/expenditure policy for which the 
household obtains the highest utility.   
We adopt the following functional form for utility:  
( , , ) ( )[ ( , ) ]φ= +U g h b v g u h b  
We assume that u(h,b) is homogeneous of degree 1.  This assumption is consistent with 
the empirical evidence on housing demand (Harmon, 1988), which suggests that the 
income elasticity of housing demand is approximately one.  Linear homogeneity of u(h,b) 
                                                 
8 While municipalities do not literally give cash grants to local residents, they do provide a variety of 
services to aid the poor. Inman (1995) identifies increasing poverty-related spending as the major source of 
increased per capita expenditure on goods, services and supplies over the period from 1973 to the onset of 
Philadelphia’s financial crisis in 1990. Inman (1989) also emphasizes the importance of redistributive 
politics as a determinant of tax policy in his study of 41 U.S cities over the period from 1961 to 1986. 
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 implies that the corresponding indirect utility function is linear in income, a property that 
will prove central in our analysis of voting equilibrium: 
( ) ( )[( (1 ) ) ( ) ]φ= − + +V y v g y m r w p     (1) 
Turning to supply, we assume that housing is produced by price-taking firms in each 
jurisdiction from land and non-land factors via a constant-returns neoclassical production 
function.  The price of non-land factors is assumed fixed and uniform throughout the 
metropolitan area.  The housing supply function in community j can then be represented 
by ( ) ( )j j j js h s hH p L h p=  where ( )js hh p  is housing per unit of land in community j and jL  is 
land area in community j, jC .  When ( , )u h b  is homogeneous of degree 1, household y's 
housing demand in jC  can be represented by ( (1 ) ) ( )j j jdy m r h p− + .  Housing market 
equilibrium in jC  then requires the following, where /(1 )= +j j jhp p t : 
 ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( ) ( )∈ − + =∫ jj j j j j jd s hy Ch p y m r f y dy L h p  (2) 
Equilibrium is an allocation of households across communities such that: 
1. Within each community: 
  a) the housing market clears 
  b) the government's budget is balanced 
c) majority rule determines the government's policy (t, m, r, g) 
2. Each community is occupied, and no one wants to move. 
The first part of the definition of equilibrium above specifies conditions for internal 
equilibrium. This together with the second condition specifies conditions for 
intercommunity equilibrium.  We develop conditions that must be satisfied for an 
allocation to be an equilibrium.  In our computational analysis, we then verify an 
8
 allocation is an equilibrium by checking that the conditions for equilibrium are satisfied.  
We develop necessary conditions for intercommunity equilibrium.  We then characterize 
Majority Voting Equilibrium, demonstrating that the median-income voter in each 
community is pivotal in determining that community’s policy choices.  
2.1 Intercommunity Equilibrium  
Proposition 1 presents conditions characterizing intercommunity equilibrium.  
Proposition 1: Consider an allocation in which all communities are occupied. If 
 ( ) ( ) ,
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
j j k k
j j k k
r w p r w p i j
m w p m w p
φ φ+ +≠ ∀ ≠− −    (3) 
 Intercommunity equilibrium is characterized by:9 
a) Income Stratification Among Communities: Each community contains 
households with incomes in a single interval.  
b) Boundary Indifference: Order communities from lowest to highest income 
levels.  Between each pair of adjacent communities in this ordering is a 
household that is indifferent between the two communities.  
c) Ascending Bundles: Incomes ascend across communities in the same order 
as ( )(1 ) ( )−j j jv g m w p .  
Proof:  Choose any pair of communities, Cj and Ck.  Using equation (1), the difference in 
utility between communities Cj and Ck for a household with income y is: 
( ) ( )[( (1 ) ) ( ) ] ( )[( (1 ) ) ( ) ]φ φΔ = − + + − − + +j j j j k k k kV y v g y m r w p v g y m r w p  (4)   
                                                 
9 Proof of this proposition builds on the approach developed in Calabrese (2001). 
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 ( )V yΔ  cannot be strictly positive for all y.  This would imply that all households prefer 
Cj, contradicting the assumption that all communities are occupied. Similarly, 
( )V yΔ cannot be strictly negative for all y, since all would then prefer Ck.   
We next demonstrate that not all households are indifferent between communities.  To 
form a contradiction, suppose all households are indifferent. This implies that 
( ) 0V y yΔ = ∀ , and hence that ΔV(y) has both intercept and slope equal to zero: 
(0) 0 ( )[ ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ]j j j k k kV v g r w p v g r w pφ φΔ = ⇒ + = +    (5)  
( ) 0 ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( )∂Δ = ⇒ − = −∂
j j j k k kV y v g m w p v g m w p
y
   (6)   
Dividing the above, we obtain ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
j j k k
j j k k
r w p r w p
m w p m w p
φ φ+ +=− − , which contradicts (3). 
The preceding results coupled with the linearity of ΔV(y) imply that there exists a unique 
ˆ 0y > for which ˆ( )V yΔ = 0.  This establishes part (b) of the proposition.  If ΔV(y) is 
downward sloping, all ˆy y< prefer community j and all ˆy y> prefer community k.  The 
reverse is true if ΔV(y) is upward sloping.  This establishes part (a). If communities are 
arrayed by ascending values of ( )(1 ) ( )−j j jv g m w p , then ΔV(y) is downward sloping, 
establishing part (c). ■ 
Remark: As income rises, the demand for g rises, and the dollar cost of an income tax 
also rises. In addition, as income rises, the demand for housing rises, causing the dollar 
cost of an increase in the unit price of housing to rise with income. The expression 
( )(1 ) ( )−j j jv g m w p impounds the effects of changes in the three variables (g,m,p) into a 
single term that is valued increasingly highly as income rises. 
10
 When φ<0, our preference function satisfies the usual single crossing condition that the 
slope of indifference curves in the (g,p) plane increases with income.  This condition 
plays an important role in characterizing stratification across communities when there is 
only one tax instrument and one type of public expenditure.  For instance, based on 
equation 3, the conditions for stratification in Proposition 1 are met as long as φ and the 
r’s in the communities are not all equal to 0.  However, even if r = 0 in every community 
because, for example, it is assumed redistributive lump-sum grants or head taxes are 
prohibited, the conditions for stratification in Proposition 1 are satisfied as long as φ is 
negative, no matter how small.  In other words if  φ = 0-ε , the conditions for 
stratification are satisfied even if ε  is vanishingly infinitesimal.  Thus, henceforth, we 
simplify by considering the indirect utility function in (1) with φ = 0. 
The value of the indirect utility function at y = 0 and its slope with respect to y are: 
(0) ( ) ( )= j j jV v g r w p       
( ) ( )(1 ) ( )∂ = −∂
j j jV y v g m w p
y
     
Consider any two communities, jC and kC  satisfying Equation (3), with average incomes 
jy  and ky respectively, jy  < ky . Hence, the intercept for Vj(y) must be greater than for 
Vk(y), and the slope less. These conditions imply Equations (7) and (8) below.  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )>j j j k k kv g r w p v g r w p  (7) 
 ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( )− < −j j j k k kv g m w p v g m w p  (8) 
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 We first develop the intercommunity equilibrium conditions when it is assumed local 
communities do not employ income tax to generate revenue.  We then consider the 
equilibrium conditions when income tax is included in the model. 
 
2.1.1 Intercommunity Equilibrium Conditions Without Income Tax 
Proposition 2: Assume local communities do not employ income tax as a revenue-
generating instrument.  The following conditions are necessary for an allocation to be an 
Intercommunity Equilibrium: 
i) Descending lump-sum grants.  The grant level is decreasing in average 
community income, i.e. jy  < ky ⇒ rj ≥ rk.   
ii) If thenj k j kg g p p> > .   
iii) If thenj k j kp p g g< < , and if thenj k j kp p g g= ≤ .   
Proof: If local communities can only employ property taxes, then equation (8) becomes:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )<j j k kv g w p v g w p  (9) 
 Part (i) follows from (7) and (9), while (ii) and (iii) follow from (9).■ 
Condition (i) accords well with intuition—low-income households migrate to the 
community with the highest level of redistribution.  If community j also offers higher 
public good provision, then clearly the price must be higher in j, as stated in  (ii). 
Alternatively, if the price in j is lower than in k, then public good provision must be 
lower in j than in k. Note that the above conditions do not rule out the possibility that the 
price in j is higher than in k and public provision in j is lower than in k. This can happen, 
for example, if the redistributive grant is substantially higher in j than in k. 
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 2.1.2 Intercommunity Equilibrium Conditions with Income Tax 
When states permit localities to employ an income tax, we have:  
Proposition 3: Assume local communities are able to employ a proportional income tax 
as a revenue-generating instrument.  Suppose WLOG that j ky y< . The following 
relationships are implied by Intercommunity Equilibrium: 
i) If j km m<  
a) then j kr r> .   
b) and if thenj k j kg g p p≥ > .   
c) and if thenk j k jp p g g≥ > .   
ii) If j kr r<  
a) then j km m> .   
b)  and if thenk j j kg g p p≥ < .   
c) and if thenj k j kp p g g≥ > .   
Proof: Parts (ia) and (iia) follow from equations (7) and (8). Parts (ib) and (ic) follow 
from (8). Parts (iib) and (iic) follow from (7).■ 
We expect that it will generally be the case that the poorer of a pair of communities will 
have both a higher income tax rate and a higher level of redistribution. However, this 
need not always be the case.  The conditions in Proposition 3 characterize restrictions on 
allocations in cases in which the income tax rate and the per capita grant do not have the 
same order.  Condition (i) of Proposition 3 states that a community with a relatively low 
income tax rate may be occupied by poor households if the community offers a relatively 
high per capita grant.  In this case, the higher-income households may prefer the 
community with the higher income tax rate if the level of government services is higher 
and/or the housing price is lower.  Proposition 3 (ii) provides the conditions for a very 
13
 unlikely equilibrium allocation in which the grant is lower and the income tax rate is 
higher in the low income community.  An allocation satisfying these conditions can be an 
equilibrium only if public good provision is extremely high and/or the price of housing is 
extremely low in the poor community relative to the wealthy community. 
2.2 Internal Equilibrium 
Recall that the conditions for internal equilibrium are that, in each community: the 
housing market clears, the government's budget is balanced, and there is a majority-rule 
equilibrium determining tax and expenditure policy.  
We define this set of all possible (t, m, r, g) combinations for community j as the Budget 
Possibility Frontier (BPF).  The characterization of this frontier is detailed further below.  
For a given community, a point (t*, m*, r*, g*) is a Majority Voting Equilibrium (MVE) if 
it is on the community's BPF and there is no point on the BPF strictly preferred to (t*, m*, 
r*, g*) by a majority of the community's residents. 
Proposition 4: The Majority Voting Equilibrium in a community is the outcome on the 
Budget Possibility Frontier most preferred by the community’s median-income voter.10 
Proof: Let x* = (g*, m*, r*, p*) denote the point most preferred by the median income 
voter, y% .  To form a contradiction suppose there exists a point x = (g, m, r, p) that defeats  
x*.  Let ( )V yΔ be the difference in utility that voter y obtains between x* and x: 
 
* * * *( ) ( )( (1 ) ) ( ) ( )( (1 ) ) ( )Δ = − + − − +V y v g y m r w p v g y m r w p  (10) 
It cannot be the case that ( )V yΔ < 0 for all y.  This would contradict the assumption that 
x* is the point most preferred by the median-income voter.  Alternatively, if ( )V yΔ > 0 
                                                 
10 The strategy of proof of this proposition is due to Cassidy (1990) who exploits the linearity of the 
indirect utility function in income to study voting equilibrium in a model with a flat grant financed by a 
property tax.  
14
 for all y, then x* is unanimously preferred to x.  If all voters are indifferent between x* 
and x (i.e., ( )V yΔ = 0 for all y), then we adopt the convention that x* is chosen. 
This leaves cases where some voters strictly prefer x* to x while others strictly prefer x to 
x*.  For these cases, the linearity of ( )V yΔ  implies that there is a unique yˆ  such that 
ˆ( )V yΔ  = 0.  There are two possibilities.  One is that voters preferring x to x* have 
incomes less that yˆ .  If x defeats x*, these voters comprise more than half the population.  
This implies y% < yˆ which in turn implies that y%  prefers x to x*.  This is a contradiction 
since x* is y% ’s most preferred outcome.  The other alternative is that voters with income 
greater than yˆ prefer x to x*.  Since x defeats x*, these voters comprise more than half the 
population.  This implies y% > yˆ  which implies that y%  prefers x to x*.  This is again a 
contradiction since y%  prefers x* to x.11 ■ 
In order to complete the characterization of intra-community equilibrium, we need to 
characterize the community Budget Possibility Frontier.  This in turn requires a 
characterization of voters’ perceptions of how the private-market equilibrium in the 
community will be affected by public policy choices. The latter is needed for two 
reasons. Voter perceptions of how the private market outcomes depend on policy affect 
their perceptions of the population to be served and the tax base. In addition, voter utility 
depends on how they expect policy changes to affect the price of housing.  
There are many possible ways to characterize the BPF, depending on the degree of voter 
sophistication in anticipating the consequences of policy changes within a community. 
Our characterization of voting behavior draws on modern club theory and assumes that 
                                                 
11 This proposition implies that the well-known Plott (1967) conditions hold for our model. 
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 individuals are utility takers.12  This means voters assume that the policy tuples (t, m, r, g) 
and housing prices in all the other communities are fixed.  Employing this utility-taking 
assumption, voters predict how the private market equilibrium would change in response 
to a prospective policy change. For example, a voter assumes the price of housing in 
his/her community is affected by changes in the government's budget through both 
changes in housing demand by current residents and migration into or out of the 
community, taking as given policies and prices in other communities.   
The income stratification result in Proposition 1 and community budget balance imply:  
 ( )( (1 ) )j j j j j j j j j jh dt p h p y m r m y r g j− + + = + ∀  (12) 
The possible (t, m, r, g) combinations for community j given (t-j, m-j, r-j, g-j) then satisfy 
housing market clearance and budget balance in community j (Equations 2 and 12), and 
the stratification and boundary-indifference conditions of Proposition 1. 
 
2.3 Owner Occupants 
Thus far, we have treated all of a jurisdiction’s residents as renters. Suppose, by contrast, 
that all residents are owner-occupants who locate in a jurisdiction and purchase housing 
there before participating in the voting process that determines the structure of the 
jurisdiction’s budget. 13 There are no transactions costs in the purchase and sale of 
housing. As in the preceding model with rental housing, households anticipate how their 
housing consumption will change in response to a change in the price of housing induced 
by a change in the structure of the jurisdiction’s tax-expenditure policies. Households 
                                                 
12As explained in Epple and Romer (1991, p. 837), the assumption of myopic voting over redistributive 
expenditures is untenable; in communities with median income less than the mean, myopic voters would 
attempt to expropriate and redistribute the entire property tax base. 
13 Our formulation of the preferences of owners builds on the approach of Epple and Romer (1991). 
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 also anticipate the capital gain or loss they will incur if their jurisdiction’s tax-
expenditure policy is changed, resulting is a change in the net-of-tax price of housing. 
Let ho be the amount of housing purchased at price ph,o by a household with endowed 
income y.  When making decisions about whether to change its consumption bundle, the 
household faces the budget constraint ,(1 ) ( )h h o om y r p p h ph b− + + − = + with ho and ph,o 
fixed.  The third term on the left-hand side is the capital gain or loss from selling the 
household’s existing dwelling.  Given linear homogeneity of the utility function in 
housing and numeraire consumption, the housing demand function is then of the form 
,( (1 ) ( ) ) ( )h h o o dh y m r p p h h p= − + + − . Substituting this function into both the budget 
constraint and the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility function:  
,( ) ( )( (1 ) ( ) ) ( ),= − + + −h h o oV y v g y m r p p h w p  
The housing demand function for a consumer with income y given (po, ro, go, mo, ph,o) is: 
 ( , (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ) ( )o o o o o d oh p y m r y m r h p− + = − +  
Consider an owner with income y who purchased at (po, ro, go, mo, ph,o).  When voting, 
such an owner may contemplate voting for a change in tax-expenditure policy that would 
cause prices, taxes, and expenditures to change to (p, r, g, m, ph).  If such a change were 
to occur, the owner’s utility at (p, r, g, m, ph) would be: 
 ,( ) ( )( (1 ) ( )(( (1 ) ) ( )) ( )= − + + − − +h h o o o d oV y v g y m r p p y m r h p w p  (13) 
Thus, when voting, owner y will vote for a change to (p, r, g, m, ph) if the utility given in 
(13) is higher than it would be if the policy were unchanged and prices and tax-
expenditure policy remained at (po, ro, go, mo, ph,o).  While renters care only about (p, r, g, 
m), it is clear from (13) that owners care about ph as well. 
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 Equation (13) is linear in household income, y.  This property of owners’ utility functions 
can be used in a straightforward fashion to extend Proposition 4 to the case where all 
households are owners.  That is, the majority voting outcome when all households in a 
community are owners is the point (p*, r*, g*, m*, ph*) that maximizes the utility of the 
owners with median income. 
We assume that all transactions occur in equilibrium.  Thus, in equilibrium, households 
make transactions at (po, ro, go, mo, ph,o) = (p, r, g, m, ph), and the majority voting outcome 
does not lead to a departure from (p, r, g, m, ph).  Note that equation (13) reduces to 
equation (1) when (po, ro, go, mo, ph,o) = (p, r, g, m, ph).  It follows that Propositions 1 
through 4 of the renters case continue to hold in the owners case.  Thus, necessary 
conditions for equilibrium in the owners’ model are the same as in the renters’ model. 
While Propositions 1 through 4 apply in the owner’s case as they do in the renter’s case, 
the equilibrium with owners will generally differ from that with renters. The reason is as 
follows. A change in a jurisdiction’s tax-expenditure policy will, in general, change the 
net-of-tax price of housing. Since owners make their purchase decisions before voting, 
they experience a capital gain or loss if they vote for a policy change. Thus, as detailed in 
(13), their utility will be affected by the change in the net-of-tax price of housing. 
Renters, by contrast, are indifferent to changes in the net-of-tax price. This leads to 
differences in equilibrium outcomes when voters are renters than when voters are owners. 
 
2.5. Equilibrium with Both Renters and Owner-Occupants 
We now extend the model to the case in which some households choose to be owner-
occupants while others choose to rent. Let ρ(y) be the proportion of metropolitan 
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 residents with income y who are renters. Since transactions occur only in equilibrium, 
choice of jurisdiction is not affected by whether the household will own or rent. Thus, 
Propositions 1 through 3 hold when there are both owners and renters. 
By contrast, there is no extension of Proposition 4 to the case with both owners and 
renters that preserves the generality of the result.  The multi-dimensional nature of the set 
of alternatives underlies the lack of generality. To resolve this existence issue, we adopt 
an idealized city-council model. We believe this city-council model to be well motivated 
from an institutional point of view and an illuminating way to characterize the majority 
outcome with both owners and renters.  We assume that, within a community, households 
sort into neighborhoods based on income.  Neighborhoods are single-member districts, 
and each sends a representative to city-council.  There are a large enough number of 
districts that, within districts, income heterogeneity is negligible.14  Thus, within a 
neighborhood, the only difference in preferences arises because some own and others 
rent.  The council member serves his/her own interests, which are also the interests of the 
type in the majority in his/her council district.  In a neighborhood with income y, the 
councilperson is a renter if ρ(y) > .5 and an owner-occupant if ρ(y) < .5.  
The composition of the council will be as follows. Let yl and yh be the lower and upper 
income boundaries of the community. The income distribution of the council will be a 
replica of the population income distribution, f(y), in the interval [yl,yh]. The median-
income member of the council will have the median income of the community.  Let yc 
solve ρ(yc)=.5. All council members with incomes less than yc will be renters and all with 
                                                 
14 Operationally, we assume a continuum of districts. 
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 incomes greater than yc will be owners.  Hence, the council member with median income, 
y% , will be a renter if y% < yc and an owner if y%  > yc. 
We assume that the council in turn elects a member to implement its policy. Members 
cannot make binding commitments. Hence, the elected member will implement his or her 
most preferred policy. Our city-council thus functions under precisely the same terms as 
the citizenry in Besley and Coate’s (1997) model of representative democracy.15 We 
show in our computational model that the most-preferred policy of the median income 
council member is a Condorcet winner among the set of council member ideal points. If 
follows from Besley and Coate (Proposition 2, Corollary 1) that the policy of the median-
income council member is adopted. 
 
3. Computational Model  
Development of more specific implications about the features of equilibrium requires 
more specific information about preferences, technology, the distributions of income and 
housing tenure, the number of jurisdictions and the land area of each.  We therefore turn 
to numerical computations based on the theoretical model above to illuminate properties 
of the model. The parameterization utilizes functional forms and parameter values that 
are broadly consistent with empirical evidence on housing supply and demand functions, 
government expenditures, and the distribution of income in the U.S. We choose the 
following Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 1( , , ) ( )U g h b g h bβ α α φ−= +  (14) 
                                                 
15 We are indebted to Richard Romano for suggesting this approach. 
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 where 0φ ε= − , and ε  is a very small positive number to ensure stratification even if the 
level of redistribution or head taxes in all communities are equal to 0.  We chose values 
for α and β such that, if g, h, and b were all privately purchased goods, the gross-of-tax 
expenditure on housing would be 1/3 and the fraction spent on local public goods would 
be 10%.16 This yields α = .37 and β = .111. 
We adopt the following constant-elasticity of housing supply function, which is implied 
by a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas housing production function: 
 ( ) ( )j j j jsH p L p
μ=  (15) 
where jL  is the land area of community j as a proportion of total land area in the 
economy, and μ is the ratio of non-land to land inputs in the production of housing.  
Based on available evidence regarding the share of land and non-land inputs in housing 
(Epple and Romer, 1991), this parameter is set equal to three.   
The distribution of income is calibrated using data from the 1999 American Housing 
Survey (AHS).17 Median income reported by the AHS is $36,942. Using data for the 14 
income classes reported by the AHS, we estimate mean income to be to $54,710. These 
and the assumption that the income distribution is lognormal imply lny ~ N(.886,10.52).  
For the mixed owners-renters, we use the following function to characterize the fraction 
of renters at each income level: 
 
1/
1/
for 
( )
1 for 
y y
y
y
δ δ
δ
γ γρ γ
−⎧ >= ⎨ ≤⎩
 (16) 
                                                 
16 We adopt and extend the approaches to calibration in Epple and Romer (1991) and Calabrese, Cassidy, 
and Epple (2002).  
17 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/99dtchrt/tab2-12.html 
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 The AHS data cited above present the number of renter- and owner-occupied housing 
units in the different income classes.  We computed average income, Y , in each income 
class, using the lognormal distribution of household income presented above.  Regressing 
the log of the proportion of households who are renters, ρ , against the log of Y  gives 
estimates of γ and δ .  The resulting regression, with t-statistics in parentheses is: 
 
2ln 8.35 .91 ln ,      .93
(9.1) (10.5)
Y Rρ = − × =
 (17) 
This equation implies γ =exp(8.35)=4215, δ =.91.18 
We consider a metropolitan area with five local jurisdictions—a large city and four 
smaller suburbs that have equal land area. The city has 40% of the total metropolitan land 
area and each of the suburbs has 15% of the land area. We assume that the city is the 
poorest jurisdiction. These conditions for income stratification (Proposition 1) are 
satisfied in all computational results reported below.  
We impose minimal a priori constraints on tax structures, as follows. We require that 
income and property tax rates be non-negative and that the income tax rates be no greater 
than one. We permit r to be either positive or negative in the suburbs. Negative values of 
r correspond to head taxes while positive values correspond to a flat grant.  Lump-sum 
head taxes are not commonly observed in practice, although impact fees and user fees, 
which are forms of head taxes, are observed.  However, it has been shown by Hamilton 
(1975) that, when communities are small and internally homogeneous, zoning constraints 
that impose a lower bound on housing consumption have the effect of turning the 
                                                 
18 In estimating this equation, we drop the highest and the three lowest income categories. The estimated 
function is used to calculate the income at which the fraction of households switches from being majority 
renter to being majority of owner occupant. Thus, fit in the interior of the income distribution is our 
primary concern. 
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 property tax into a head tax. While our suburban communities are not the infinitesimal 
size assumed by Hamilton, we approximate by assuming that zoning constraints permit 
communities to effectively convert property taxes into head taxes. In the central-city, r 
must be non-negative due to feasibility constraints.  The support of the income 
distribution is the positive real line; a head tax would violate the budget constraint of the 
poorest households. 
 
3.2 Equilibrium when All Households are Renters  
When local tax rates are not constrained by the state, equilibrium outcomes in the all-
renters economy are reported in column 1 of Table 1.  Consider first the results for 
community 1 (C1). C1 chooses a property tax rate of .33. As we noted above, property tax 
rates in our model are expressed as a proportion of the annualized implicit rental value of 
housing services. As we noted in the introduction, observed property taxes are expressed 
as a proportion of the market value of housing, not on the annual value of services. Using 
the 9% rate discussed in footnote 6, the 33% rate on annual implicit rent for C1 in column 
(1) is equivalent to a tax rate on property value of 3% ( ≅ 0.09 x 0.33). In addition to the 
property tax, C1 also imposes an income tax at rate 12.4%. The revenues from the 
property and income taxes generate a total of $3,983 per capita. These revenues are 
allocated to provide public services of $1,984 per capita and a flat grant of $1,999 per 
capita. Thus, in this equilibrium, revenues in the poorest community are divided almost 
equally between expenditures on public services and redistributive expenditures.  
The remaining communities choose an income tax of zero. They fund expenditures on 
public services with a combination of head taxes and property taxes. As community 
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 income rises, reliance on property taxes decreases and reliance on head taxes increases. 
Wealthy communities choose very high public expenditure levels. As we show later, 
these high expenditure levels in wealthy communities are due in part to the incentives of 
renter households as compared to owner occupants.  
With the preceding as a baseline, we now investigate state restrictions on local taxes. 
 
3.3 The Impact of State Prohibition of Local Head Taxes 
The baseline computation indicated that the median voters in each of the suburbs would 
choose a head tax to partially or fully finance the publicly provided good.  This result is 
not surprising given the known efficiency results of financing public expenditures 
through a head tax.  However, it is also well known that the distributional effects usually 
make head taxes politically infeasible.  In this section, we study the political economy of 
prohibition of local head taxes.  The state electorate in our analysis is the combined 
electorates of the city and suburbs.  We determine political support by calculating the 
effects of prohibiting local head taxes on the welfare of individual households and deduce 
from this the extent of political support for such a prohibition.  We also calculate the 
aggregate welfare effects (compensating variation plus change in economic rents). 
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the equilibrium with no head taxes.  An obvious result from 
the table is that if communities cannot use a head taxes, local government expenditures 
on public goods decreases significantly.  Every community reduces its expenditures on 
public goods.  The central city also reduces its lump sum grant and thus the level of 
income redistribution it undertakes.  In general, the communities increase both property 
and income tax rates in an effort to offset the loss of revenue from the head tax.  Without 
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 head taxes there is a reallocation of households from the two relatively poorer 
communities to the three wealthiest communities.  This reallocation causes all the 
communities to experience a decrease in their tax bases as measured by average income, 
which contributes to the lower public good expenditures.  Even in the central city, where 
the poorer pivotal voter should prefer a higher level of redistribution, the large decrease 
in the tax base counters this effect.  The reallocation of households also leads to housing 
prices to fall in the lower income communities and increase in the higher income 
communities. 
Even though the level of redistribution falls in the central city and public good 
expenditures fall in every community, almost all the poor and middle income households 
are made better off when head taxes are prohibited.  For these households the lower price 
of housing in the three lower income communities offset the loss in welfare due to the 
lower level of public expenditures.  Also, in general, more of the taxation burden is 
shifted to the absentee landlords because of the overall increase in metropolitan property 
taxes that offset head tax revenue losses.  In addition, the income taxes do not increase 
significantly in the lower income communities.  All these factors contribute to over 64% 
of the total metropolitan population supporting prohibition on head taxes.  This result 
provides some explanation as to why head taxes lack political support even though they 
are the most economically efficient tax instrument. 
 
3.4 The Impact of State Prohibition of Local Income Taxes 
As we noted in the introduction, several states explicitly ban the use of income taxes by 
local municipalities either in state statutes or in constitutions and other states effectively 
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 preclude use of local income taxes through absence of authorization for localities to 
impose income taxes.  In this section, we study the political economy of prohibition of 
local income taxes.  We assume that head taxes are not politically feasible and no 
community has a head tax when local income taxes are banned. 
Column 3 of Table 1 shows the equilibrium with a ban on local income taxes.  In the new 
equilibrium, the property tax rates increase in almost all of the communities (except 
community 2) to offset a portion of the revenue loss from eliminating the income tax.  
This is especially true in the central city, which had the heaviest reliance on income taxes 
before the ban.  The income tax ban leads to the opposite migration effect of the head tax 
prohibition, although the magnitude of the effect is much smaller.  That is, there is some 
slight migration from the suburbs to the central city.  All the suburbs experience a slight 
reduction in population, and the central city population increases from 24.3% to 26.7% of 
the metropolitan population.  However, even with the increase in the tax base coupled 
with the large increase in the property tax rate cannot offset the loss in tax revenue in 
central city.  Per capita redistributive expenditure falls about 33% in the city and 
expenditures on local public services also falls.  The two poorest suburbs have small 
increases in local public service expenditure while the two richest suburbs have small 
decreases in the local public service expenditure even though these suburbs had the 
greatest increases in property tax rates. 
Due to the increases in the property tax rates, gross of tax price of housing increases in all 
the communities.  However, despite increases in the tax bases (average incomes), the net-
of-tax price of housing changes only negligibly in all the communities. 
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 Obviously the poorest households in the central city are made worse off by an income tax 
ban.  These households receive less redistribution and public services and have to pay a 
much higher price per unit of housing.  The ban on income tax probably does not offset 
the losses to the very poorest households from the lower government expenditures and 
higher price of housing since these low income households pay relatively little income 
taxes.  However, it is unclear from just examining the equilibrium outcomes if the higher 
income households in the city and the suburban households are better off with the income 
tax ban.  For instance, the higher income households in the city are burdened more by 
income taxes than the very poor households, especially if the income tax finances a 
redistributive lump-sum grant, and may be better off with no income tax even if public 
services fall.  Also, households that remain in communities 2 and 3 have slightly lower 
tax burdens and slightly greater public service levels and housing prices, and thus it is 
ambiguous as to whether they are better off or not.  The households that remain in 
communities 4 and 5 have less public services, higher housing prices and property tax 
rates, but are no longer burdened by income taxes.  In addition, when public expenditures 
are financed solely by property taxes, as in communities 2 to 5, more of the burden is 
exported to the absentee landlords in this renters model. 
In fact, compensating variation calculations indicate all the households that reside in the 
suburbs before the income tax ban are made better off.  An income tax ban also makes a 
small portion of the richest households in the city better off, bringing total support for the 
ban to over 80% of the metropolitan population. Thus, a state government, serving both 
city and suburban residents, would find strong political support for a ban on local income 
taxation. 
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 3.5 State Restrictions on Property Tax Rates 
State restrictions on local property taxes are very common.  As noted in the introduction, 
forty-six of the states place some form of restriction on local property taxes, with more 
than half setting a limit on the property tax rate that municipalities may impose. We study 
the political economy of state limits on local property taxes by examining the effects of a 
prohibition on local income taxes in conjunction with a 35% limit on property taxes as a 
percentage of annual implicit rent. At discount rates of 7% to 9% (see footnote 6), this 
limit translates to a tax rate limit on property value on the order of 2.5% to 3%. This 
combination of tax restrictions corresponds closely to state restrictions in Massachusetts. 
Thus, these restrictions are illustrative of limitations observed in practice. 
Equilibrium with the property tax limit is in column (4) of Table 1.  Only communities 1, 
4 and 5 are restricted by this the 35% property tax rate limit.  One impact of imposing 
this limit is that the communities that are not directly impacted, communities 2 and 3, are 
indirectly impacted because these communities also lower their property tax rates even 
though they are not required to do so. 
Relatively higher income households migrate into communities 1 and 2.  However, the 
higher income households in community 3 migrate out to community 4 when community 
4 reduces its property tax rate from 50.6% to the 35% limit.  This occurs even though 
community 3 reduces its rate from 33.7% to 28.2%.  Community 4 also experiences out-
migration of it highest income households into community 5 after the property tax limit is 
imposed. 
As in the income tax ban, the very poor in the city are made worse off because the city’s 
redistributive per capita lump-sum grant is reduced by over 50% and the public services 
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 expenditure falls by 30%.  City population increases as higher income households move 
in, and the wealthier pivotal voter opts to allocate more of the reduced tax revenues to 
services.  Suburban residents gain from a reduction in the price of housing, but lose from 
a decrease in public services per capita.  However, although most of households that were 
city residents before the property tax limit is imposed are made worse off by the limit, all 
who reside in the suburbs before the property tax limit (74% of the metropolitan 
population) are better off because of the tax limit.  These residents, combined with city 
residents who gain from the tax limit, result in a total of 79% of the metropolitan 
population favoring the tax limit. 
 
3.6 Aggregate Welfare Effects 
The welfare effects of the head tax ban, income tax ban and property tax limit are 
summarized in Table 2.  The aggregate welfare losses associated with the head tax ban 
are quite substantial.  This is the case even though as indicated above the distributional 
effects are such that over 64% of the population supports the ban.  Almost all the poor 
and middle class support the ban.  The rich (above $69,000 in income) not only prefer the 
head taxes, but are so significantly negatively affected by the ban that their aggregate 
welfare losses outweigh the gains to the other 64% of the population.  This is another 
indication of the efficiency but political infeasibility of head taxes. 
The income tax ban and the property tax limits have quite substantial positive 
aggregate welfare gains. These gains reflect the large distortions caused by unrestricted 
local taxes. The poorest households are worse off after the change, but a modest increase 
in redistributive expenditures by the state government would serve to compensate lower 
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 income households while avoiding the large distortions associated with local 
redistributive taxation.  
 
3.7 Owner-Occupancy and State Tax Limitations 
In Table 3, we study for owner occupants the same four cases considered for renters. 
Consider first the case without state restrictions. From a comparison of column (1) of 
Table 3 to column (1) of Table 1, we see that the city spends 17% more per capita on 
public services when all households are owner occupants than when all households are 
renters. In addition, in stark contrast to the equilibrium with renters, no redistribution is 
undertaken in the city when households are owner occupants.  The city cannot have head 
taxes because of an infeasibility constraint for the very low income households. When all 
households are owner-occupants, the primary revenue instrument used by the city is the 
income tax, with a relatively modest property tax. The distribution of households across 
city and suburbs is also very different in the two cases. In the equilibrium with owner 
occupants, 57% of households reside in the city whereas only 44% do so in the 
equilibrium with all renters.  
Comparison of column (1) of Table 3 to the corresponding column of Table 1 also 
reveals substantial differences in suburban spending between the two cases. The two 
wealthiest suburbs have much lower tax rates and lower per capita expenditure when all 
households are owner occupants. When all households are renters, a portion of any tax 
increase is shifted to landowners. When all households are owner occupants, taxes that 
drive down housing prices result in capital losses for occupants. Owners internalize the 
effects of taxes on property values, leading them to support lower taxes and expenditures.  
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 We next consider the effect of a state prohibition on local head taxes.  Just as in the all-
renters model, banning head taxes leads to net out-migration from the city and the poorest 
suburb into the richer suburbs.  The richest households in each of the communities 
(except of course the richest community) migrate into the next richest community, with 
the net effect being the three richest suburbs gain population and city and poorest suburb 
lose population.  This re-allocation of households causes a reduction in the median 
income in all the communities.  The lower income pivotal voter in the city prefers a less 
public service expenditures.  In the suburbs the ban on head taxes causes income taxes to 
increase considerably.  The additional revenue from the higher income taxes, though, 
does not offset the loss in head tax revenue, and public service expenditures fall in all the 
communities.  The fact that in each community the new pivotal voter has less income 
than the previous pivotal voter also contributes to less public service expenditures. 
It is not surprising that if capital losses on house consumption is not included, all the 
middle class and poor are made better off by the head tax ban, but the rich are made 
worse-off.  The distributional effects based on compensating variation but not including 
the capital gains or losses on housing consumption is all households with income below 
approximately $60,000 are made worse off, which is about 70% of the metropolitan 
population.  What is surprising is that if capital losses are included in individual 
household welfare effects, these losses are so large they trump the compensating 
variation gains for the middle class and poor households and every household in the 
metropolitan area is made worse-off.  This result indicates if every household was an 
owner, local head taxes would be much more common.  The efficiency losses per capita 
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 are also considerable.  If households are owners, prohibiting head taxes results in a per 
capita welfare loss of -$2,040. 
Just as we did in the all-renters model, we next consider the effect of a state prohibition 
on local income taxes when there are no existing local head taxes for the all owners 
model.  Comparing columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, we see that banning the income tax 
results in significant increases in property taxes in all the communities.  Even with these 
significant increases in property tax to offset the loss in income tax revenue, each 
community reduces expenditures per capita.  These reductions range from over 12% in 
the poorest community to over 20% in the richest community.  There are only minimal 
household migration effects.  The compensating variation calculations indicate that every 
household in this all-owner model prefers banning local income taxes.  However, the 
increase in the property taxes in each community decreases the net-of-tax price of 
housing to such a degree that all the households in the metropolitan area are hit with  
capital losses on housing that are so large that they offset any utility gains as measured by 
compensating variation.  Hence, the model predicts if all households are owner 
occupants, there would be no support at the state level for banning local income taxes.  
Because of the large loss in rents to owner occupants, the imposition of a ban on income 
taxation results in a per capita welfare loss of $378. 
Only the three middle income suburbs are directly affected by the imposition of the limit 
on property taxes in this all-owner model (table 3, column 4).  The property tax limit 
results in a further reduction of expenditure per capita in these three suburbs.  The city 
and the riches suburb are not constrained by the limit and there only relatively modest 
indirect effects in these two communities due to the minimal household migration.  In 
32
 contrast to the lack of support for the income tax ban, when individual household welfare 
is measured by compensating variation plus capital gains or losses, over 65% of the 
population in the metropolitan area favors the limit.  Limiting property taxes increases 
per capita welfare by $239 when the gains in rents are included. 
 
3.8 Owners, Renters and Tax Limits 
The preceding results highlight the central role of home ownership as a determinant of 
local tax and expenditure policy. Those policies in turn influence the extent of popular 
support for state restrictions on local taxes. We now consider choice of tax policy in a 
metropolitan occupied by both owners and renters. To characterize policy outcomes, we 
employ the city-council model introduced earlier. Column (1) of Table 4 reports the 
outcome when there are no state restrictions on local tax policy. In this equilibrium, the 
median-income council member in the city is a renter. In all suburbs, the pivotal council 
member is an owner-occupant. We see that the city spends $4,215 per capita, with $2,128 
of that expenditure devoted to public services and the remainder to provide a 
redistributive grant, with funding from a combination of property and income taxes. By 
contrast, the suburbs provide no redistributive grant and rely almost exclusively on head 
taxes for funding public services. Here, 48% of metropolitan residents reside in the city. 
To provide further insight into the model with both owners and renters, we present in 
Figure 1 most-preferred tax rates and expenditures as a function of council member 
income. Council members from low-income districts prefer high income tax rates, high 
redistributive grants, and moderate expenditures on public services. As council member 
income rises, the preferred income tax rate and level of redistributive expenditure falls, 
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 and the preferred level of spending on government services rises. At incomes below 
$21,752, the fraction of households who are renters exceeds half, hence the district 
councilperson is a renter; above that income, the fraction that is owners exceeds half and 
the district councilperson is an owner. The discrete changes observed in Figures 1 at this 
income level arise due to differing preferences of renters and owner occupants. Relative 
to renters, these higher-income owner occupants prefer lower tax rates, higher 
expenditures on government services, and no expenditures on redistribution.  
Figure 2 shows the vote garnered when the median income ($19,688) council members’ 
most preferred policy is paired against the most-preferred policy of each other council 
member. As the figure demonstrates, the vote favoring the median ideal point exceeds 
50% in all cases. This confirms that the median ideal point is a Condorcet winner against 
all the other ideal points. Besley and Coate (1997) demonstrate that this condition is 
necessary and sufficient for a single-candidate equilibrium. Thus, the most-preferred 
outcome of the median-income council member is implemented.19 
Two further points are of interest with respect to the result just described. One is that this 
allocation does not satisfy the Plott (1967) conditions. There are feasible alternatives that 
defeat the policy preferred by the median-income voter. However, those alternatives are 
not the most-preferred policy of any voter and thus fail the credibility restriction adopted 
by Besley and Coate. This result illustrates the power of the Besley-Coate framework. 
The second observation concerns the role of our city-council formulation. Suppose 
candidates not nominated by their districts could nonetheless garner the resources to run. 
There would then be candidates whose ideal points defeat the ideal point of the median-
                                                 
19 The policy most preferred by owners with income above $21,752 is the same for all those owners. This 
accounts for the horizontal segment beginning at income $21,752 in the vote graph in Figure 2. 
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 income council member. Such ideal points are not equilibria, however.20 Our city-council 
formulation assures that such candidates do not represent their respective districts on the 
city-council. 
We now turn to the outcome with a prohibition of local head taxes.  The results are 
presented in column (2) Table 4.  Just as in the all-renters and all-owners models, 
prohibiting head taxes causes dramatic migration out of the city and the poorest suburb 
and into the three other communities, especially the wealthiest suburb, community 5.  
The percent of the metropolitan population residing in community 5 increases form 5.6% 
to 22.6%, whereas the percentage of the population residing in the city falls from 47.8% 
to 24.8%.  Even though the city is not constrained by the prohibition on local head taxes, 
the out-migration effects and the concomitant reduction in the tax base leads to more than 
a 25% drop in public expenditure per capita.  The new lower income pivotal voter prefers 
a significantly greater reduction in public services than in the redistributive lump-sum 
grant.  All the suburbs increase their income tax rates and three of the suburbs increase 
their property tax rates to try to offset the losses in head tax revenue.  Public service 
expenditures fall in all the suburbs due not only to the loss of head taxes but also the 
lower tax bases (mean income) in all the communities. 
The distributional effects on the prohibition of local head taxes are shown in Figure 3.  
The only households that are made better off by the ban are renters with incomes between 
approximately $14,500 and $55,500, or about 20% of the total metropolitan population.  
Hence, head taxes seem to have political support.  Even the majority of the households in 
the city would not support a ban.  However, a head tax would not be implemented in the 
city.  As shown in column 1 of Table 4, and as previously mentioned, the median voter in 
                                                 
20 Details documenting all claims in this paragraph are available on request. 
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 the city prefers a positive lump-sum grant of $2,087 as opposed to head tax, which would 
be a negative lump-sum grant.  However, all the suburbs implement head taxes, which 
cause many more households to reside in the city.  These household are wealthier than 
the residents in the city when head taxes are prohibited.  The associated higher tax base in 
the city permits provision of higher public good levels with a lower income tax rate.  
Hence, the relatively poorer households in the city have an incentive to permit head taxes 
even though a head tax will not be implemented in the city.  This is because the suburbs 
will implement head taxes, driving migration into the city and improving the welfare of 
city residents.  Consistent with this result, head taxes, especially in the form of impact 
fees and user fees, are more commonly observed in suburbs than in central cities.  In 
addition, minimum housing consumption zoning requirements, which as mentioned 
above were shown by Hamilton to have effects similar to head taxes, are much more 
common in suburbs.  Prohibiting head taxes causes a per-capita efficiency loss of $2,413 
measured by compensating variation plus changes in economic rents in the housing 
market. 
We now turn to the outcome with a prohibition of local income taxes given the same 
scenario as in the all-renters and all-owners models, that local head taxes had never been 
previously authorized by the state.  The results are presented in column (3) Table 4. 
Expenditure per capita in the city again drops more than 25%, although unlike when only 
head taxes are prohibited, most of the drop is in redistributive grant, which is reduced by 
34%.  Expenditures in the city are funded entirely by a property tax, which increases by 
over 138% in response to the income tax ban.  Expenditures in the suburbs also fall, but 
not as much as in the city.  Each suburb increases property taxes to offset the loss in 
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 income tax revenue.  As a consequence, there are minimal migration effects as the 
population in each community remains relatively stable.  There is some slight migration 
into the city as its share of the metropolitan population increases from 24.8% to 26.1% 
The distributional effects on the prohibition of local income taxes in case where there are 
no head taxes are shown in Figure 4.  All renters with income above $16,500 are better 
off without local income taxes.  Only owners with income from approximately $18,000 
to $21,000 are made better off.  This means that only 25% of the metropolitan population 
supports the income tax ban.  Almost all renters are made better off because the ban on 
income taxes does not decrease public service expenditures significantly and shifts more 
of the burden of financing public services to landowners through increases in property 
taxes.  The renters pay more per unit of housing, but the increase in housing prices per 
unit is less than the increase in the property tax.  Almost all the owners are made worse 
off because of capital losses on housing.  The net-of-tax price of housing falls in all the 
communities so homeowners experience capital losses, but the gross-of-tax price of 
hosing increases in all the communities, so they adjust to lower housing consumption.  If 
all households were renters, prohibiting income taxes would lead to per-capita welfare 
gain measured by compensating variation of $349.  However, rents fall on a per capita 
basis by $650, so there is a per capita welfare loss of $301. 
Imposition of the limit on property taxes results in the outcome shown in column (4) of 
Table 4.  Since very few states authorize local head or income taxes, we examine the 
effects of a state mandated limit on local property taxes when property taxes are the only 
tax instrument available to local communities.  This is again consistent with our analysis 
of the all-renters and all-owners models.  Under this scenario, only communities 1 (city), 
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 3 and 4 are constrained by the property tax limit.  The city is the most affected by the 
limit.  This is expected since the city had the highest property tax rate.  Expenditures fall 
significantly in the city.  The redistributive grant drops more than 50%.  In addition, the 
price of housing in the city falls significantly.  However, these factors do not lead to a 
flood of rich households into the city, as one would expect.  There is only a small amount 
of migration into the city.  This is due to the low level of public services.  The 
expenditure per capita on public services is three times as great in the poorest suburb than 
in the city.  The relatively richer households are willing to pay an almost 30% higher 
price of housing to consume almost three times as much public services. 
Unlike with the head tax and income tax ban, there is overwhelming political support for 
a metropolitan wide property tax limit.  As Figure 5 indicates, only the relatively poor 
households in the city are made worse off by the property tax limit.  These include renter 
households with income below $18,000 and owner households with income below 
$11,000, for a total of about 17% of the population.  This result is not surprising given 
that only in the city did public expenditures fall significantly. This result also means that 
residents in communities that are not constrained by the tax limit (communities 2 and 5) 
support the limit to constrain other communities.  This result provides support for 
Vigdor’s (2001) hypothesis that support for local tax limits does not only come from 
voters wishing to limit the taxes their own locality imposes, but also from the desire of 
voters to limit tax rates in localities in which they do not reside 
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 4. Conclusion 
We find that tax limitations have very substantial effects on housing prices and the 
composition of communities.  If head taxes are prohibited, adjustments following 
introduction of tax limits result in an increase in median incomes in all communities.  The 
electorates of all communities, but particularly the central-city, then adopt policies 
different from those that prevail in the absence of tax limitations.  Tax limits thereby have 
striking effects on spending in the city, reducing expenditures on redistribution and 
public good provision.  Prohibiting head taxes and income taxes reduces public good 
expenditures all the communities; however property tax limits increases per capita 
expenditures on public good provision in the richest community. 
Our model provides an explanation of political support for tax limitations.  Our results 
provide support for Vigdor’s (2001) hypothesis that support for local tax limits does not 
come only  from voters wishing to limit the taxes their own locality imposes, but also 
from the desire of voters to limit tax rates in localities in which they do not reside.  While 
we propose a somewhat different mechanism than Vigdor as driving support for state tax 
limitations, his insight that support for tax limits comes from voters wishing to constrain 
taxes in other communities is nonetheless fundamental. A further insight of Vigdor’s is 
also ratified by our analysis: A property tax limit can have effects in communities that are 
not bounded by the limit in equilibrium.  The change in community composition induced 
by a tax limit in turn leads to a change in the pivotal voter, and hence in the policies that 
voter adopts. 
Finally, our analysis demonstrates the importance, when evaluating tax limits, of a 
framework that permits consideration of multiple policy instruments. We find that 
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 banning head taxes has the greatest impact on local public expenditures.  Successive bans 
on local income taxes and limits on property taxes lead to large reductions in 
redistributive expenditures while having much more modest impact on expenditures for 
locally provided public goods. 
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 Figure 3: Welfare Effects of Prohibition of Local 
Head Tax
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Figure 4: Welfare Effects of Prohibition of Local 
Income Tax when Head Taxes are Prohibited
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Figure 5: Welfare Effects of Imposing a Limit on 
Property Tax Rates when Income Taxes and Head 
Taxes are Prohibited
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Table 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
t1 0.333 0.333 0.776 0.350
t2 0.260 0.183 0.180 0.163
t3 0.010 0.333 0.337 0.282
t4 0.013 0.333 0.506 0.350
 
Property 
Tax 
Rates 
t5 0.000 0.333 0.648 0.350
m1 0.124 0.154 0.000 0.000
m2 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000
m3 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
m4 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000
 
Income  
Tax 
Rates 
m5 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000
g1 $1,984 $1,362 $1,190 $835
g2 $4,942 $1,381 $1,441 $1,358
g3 $9,639 $3,410 $3,451 $2,991
g4 $18,239 $7,472 $7,202 $5,397
 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
On Public 
Services 
g5 $42,027 $22,003 $19,995 $12,822
r1 $1,999 $1,765 $1,183 $559
r2 $-1,703 0 0 0
r3 $-7,229 0 0 0
r4 $-17,642 0 0 0
 
Per Capita 
Grant 
Or 
Head Tax 
r5 $-42,027 0 0 0
N1 43.5% 24.3% 26.7% 28.4%
N2 27.1% 14.3% 13.8% 12.6%
N3 18.1% 19.1% 18.4% 17.0%
N4 8.7% 20.5% 19.7% 19.3%
 
 
Population  
Shares 
N5 2.6% 21.9% 21.4% 22.8%
p1 $11.48 $9.04 $11.94 $9.84
p2 $15.43 $10.89 $10.92 $10.63
p3 $14.37 $14.12 $14.15 $13.43
p4 $12.94 $15.96 $17.61 $16.01
 
Gross-of-
Tax 
Housing  
Prices 
p5 $11.42 $20.03 $23.88 $20.73
1y%  $18,507 $13,118 $13,826 $14,286
2y%  $43,258 $24,055 $25,397 $26,041
3y%  $76,957 $35,419 $36,684 $36,508
4y%  $136,715 $55,736 $56,924 $55,389
 
 
Pivotal 
Voter 
Incomes 
5y%  $264,795 $109,794 $111,034 $107,631
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Table 2: Per Capita Welfare Effects of Income Tax Ban and Property 
Tax Limitations 
 
 Per Capita Compensating Variation 
Per Capita Change in 
Land Rents 
Per Capita Change in 
Welfare 
Head Tax Ban -$2,495 -$489 -$2,984 
Income Tax Ban $147 -$329 $182 
3.5% Property Tax 
Limitation after 
Income Tax Ban $130 $519 $649 
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 Table 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
t1 0.083 0.133 0.333 0.333
t2 0.001 0.030 0.401 0.350
t3 0.000 0.004 0.454 0.350
t4 0.000 0.075 0.649 0.350
 
Property 
Tax 
Rates 
t5 0.083 0.000 0.242 0.243
m1 0.075 0.062 0.000 0.000
m2 0.004 0.115 0.000 0.000
m3 0.003 0.139 0.000 0.000
m4 0.004 0.153 0.000 0.000
 
Income  
Tax 
Rates 
m5 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000
g1 $2,321 $1,682 $1,474 $1,457
g2 $5,351 $4,040 $3,328 $2,964
g3 $8,134 $6,379 $5,155 $4,175
g4 $12,461 $11,424 $9,614 $6,258
 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
On Public 
Services 
g5 $22,878 $13,325 $10,625 $10,689
r1 $0 $0 $0 $0
r2 -$5,099 $0 $0 $0
r3 -$7,879 $0 $0 $0
r4 -$12,005 $0 $0 $0
 
Per Capita 
Grant 
Or 
Head Tax 
r5 -$16,288 $0 $0 $0
N1 56.9% 36.7% 35.0% 34.5%
N2 18.1% 14.8% 15.1% 14.7%
N3 12.1% 14.9% 16.0% 15.7%
N4 8.0% 14.4% 15.5% 17.0%
 
 
Population  
Shares 
N5 4.8% 19.2% 18.4% 18.2%
p1 $10.91 $9.34 $10.52 $10.44
p2 $12.14 $10.34 $13.39 $12.89
p3 $12.19 $10.98 $15.25 $14.27
p4 $12.22 $12.51 $18.36 $16.10
 
Gross-of-
Tax 
Housing  
Prices 
p5 $13.69 $15.79 $18.91 $18.89
1y%  $22,310 $16,604 $16,147 $15,985
2y%  $53,191 $32,364 $31,294 $30,758
3y%  $80,585 $45,091 $44,277 $43,209
4y%  $122,209 $64,568 $65,075 $64,183
 
 
Pivotal 
Voter 
Incomes 
5y%  $212,514 $117,350 $119,997 $120,642
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Table 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
t1 0.333 0.333 0.776 0.350
t2 0.002 0.056 0.314 0.316
t3 0.000 0.021 0.430 0.350
t4 0.000 0.065 0.606 0.350
 
Property 
Tax 
Rates 
t5 0.084 0.000 0.240 0.241
m1 0.122 0.153 0.000 0.000
m2 0.006 0.083 0.000 0.000
m3 0.004 0.127 0.000 0.000
m4 0.004 0.146 0.000 0.000
 
Income  
Tax 
Rates 
m5 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000
g1 $2,128 $1,380 $1,172 $824
g2 $4,564 $2,566 $2,296 $2,374
g3 $7,339 $5,074 $4,304 $3,749
g4 $11,582 $9,517 $8,312 $5,782
 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
On Public 
Services 
g5 $21,748 $12,312 $9,920 $10,116
r1 $2,087 $1,773 $1,167 $546
r2 -$4,255 $0 $0 $0
r3 -$7,079 $0 $0 $0
r4 -$11,123 $0 $0 $0
 
Per Capita 
Grant 
Or 
Head Tax 
r5 -$15,443 $0 $0 $0
N1 47.8% 24.8% 26.1% 27.6%
N2 22.7% 17.3% 16.5% 15.9%
N3 14.6% 17.7% 18.2% 17.4%
N4 9.4% 17.5% 18.2% 18.9%
 
 
Population  
Shares 
N5 5.6% 22.6% 21.0% 20.3%
p1 $11.96 $9.13 $11.82 $9.73
p2 $12.36 $10.40 $12.45 $12.44
p3 $12.44 $11.15 $15.00 $14.25
p4 $12.49 $12.66 $18.25 $16.21
 
Gross-of-Tax 
Housing  
Prices 
p5 $14.02 $16.14 $19.24 $19.15
1y%  $19,688 $13,281 $13,629 $14,058
2y%  $45,293 $25,305 $25,832 $26,592
3y%  $72,635 $37,755 $38,342 $38,784
4y%  $113,456 $56,782 $58,596 $59,255
 
 
Pivotal 
Voter 
Incomes 
5y%  $201,363 $107,986 $112,145 $114,255
 
47
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1988. Local revenue Diversification: 
Local Income Taxes. Staff report.  Washington, D.C. 
 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1995(a). Tax and Expenditure Limits on 
local Governments.  Washington, D.C. 
 
________, 1995(b), Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism.  Washington, D.C. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate, “An Economic Theory of Representative Democracy,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,1 (February 1997): 85-114. 
 
Bucovetsky, Sam, “Choosing Tax Rates and Public Expenditure Levels Using Majority Rule,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 46 (1991): 113-131.  
 
Calabrese, Stephen M., "Local Redistribution Financed by Income Tax," Public 
Finance Review, 29, 4, (July 2001): 259-303. 
 
Calabrese, Stephen M., Glenn  Cassidy, and Dennis Epple, “Urban Fiscal Structure and 
Metropolitan Consolidation,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 2002. 
 
Cassidy, Glenn, Mobility and Choice: Three Essays on the Political Economy of Local 
Government, Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University, 1990. 
 
Ellickson, Bryan, “Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice,” American Economic 
Review, 61, May 1971, 334-339. 
 
Epple, Dennis, Radu Filimon, and Thomas Romer, “Equilibrium Among Local Jurisdictions: 
Toward an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice,” Journal of Public 
Economics, 24, August 1984, 281-308. 
 
Epple, Dennis and Richard Romano, “Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of 
Educational Benefits,” in The Economics of School Choice (C. Hoxby, Ed.), National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2003. 
 
Epple, Dennis and Thomas Romer, “Mobility and Redistribution,” Journal of Political Economy, 
99, August 1991, 828-858. 
 
Epple, Dennis, Thomas Romer and Holger Sieg, “Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: 
An Empirical Analysis,” Econometrica, November 2001. 
 
Epple, Dennis and Holger Sieg, “Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 107(4), August 1999, 645-681. 
 
Fernandez, Raquel and Richard Rogerson, “Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality 
of Public Education,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), February 1996, 135-164. 
 
_________________________________, “Public Education and Income Distribution: A 
Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform” American Economic Review, 
88(4), September 1998: 813-33. 
48
  
Fischel, William, "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13," National Tax 42(4) (1989): 465-473. 
 
Goodspeed, Timothy, “A Re-examination of the Use of Ability to Pay Taxes by Local 
Governments,” Journal of Public Economics, 38(3), April 1989: 319-42. 
 
Hamilton, Bruce, “Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, Urban 
Studies, v1, n2 (June 1975): 205-211. 
 
 Henderson, J. Vernon, “Community Choice of Revenue Instruments,” Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 24, 2 (April 1994): 159-183. 
 
Inman, Robert P., “How to Have a Fiscal Crisis: Lessons from Philadelphia,” American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 85, 2 (May 1995): 378-383. 
 
__________,   “The Local Decision to Tax: Evidence from Large U.S. Cities,” Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, 19, 3 (August 1989): 455-491. 
 
Mieszkowski, Peter and Edwin S. Mills, “The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 7, 3 (Summer 1993): 135-148. 
 
Mills, Edwin S., Urban Economics, Glenview, Illinios: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972. 
 
Nechyba, Thomas J., ”Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional 
Competition and Collusion” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 2 (April 1997): 351-84 
 
O'Sullivan, Arthur, Terri Sexton, and Steven Sheffrin, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Poterba, James, “Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers,” American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings, 82 (May 1992): 237-242. 
 
Plott, Charles, “A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule,” American 
Economic Review, 57, 4 (September 1967): 787:806. 
 
Vigdor, Jacob, “Median Voters, Marginal Residents, and Property Tax Limitations” 
Working Paper, Duke University, June 19, 2001. 
 
Westhoff, Frank, “Existence of Equilibrium in Economies with a Local Public Good,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 14, February 1977, 84-112. 
 
Zodrow, George, “The Incidence of Metropolitan Property Tax Base Sharing and Rate 
Equalization,” Journal of Urban Economics, 15 (1984): 210-22. 
49
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2007 
 
2007/1. Durán Cabré, J.Mª.; Esteller Moré, A.: "An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. tax 
compliance" 
2007/2. Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm 
location" 
2007/3. Duch, N.; Montolio, D.; Mediavilla, M.: "Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s 
performance: A quasi experimental approach" 
2007/4. Sánchez Hugalde, A.: "Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar" 
2007/5. Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Economic and political determinants of urban expansion: Exploring 
the local connection" 
2007/6. Segarra-Blasco, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel-Carrizosa, M.: "Barriers to innovation and public policy 
in Catalonia" 
2007/7. Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Evaluación de servicios educativos: El rendimiento en los centros públicos y 
privados medido en PISA-2003" 
2007/8. Argilés, J.M.; Duch Brown, N.: "A comparison of the economic and environmental performances of 
conventional and organic farming: Evidence from financial statement" 
 
2008 
 
2008/1. Castells, P.; Trillas, F.: "Political parties and the economy: Macro convergence, micro partisanship?" 
2008/2. Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of 
intergovernmental transfers?" 
2008/3. Schelker, M.; Eichenberger, R.: "Rethinking public auditing institutions: Empirical evidence from Swiss 
municipalities" 
2008/4. Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "Which communities should be afraid of mobility? The effects of 
agglomeration economies on the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes" 
2008/5. Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: "Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: do the 
experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?" 
2008/6. Solé-Ollé, A.; Hortas Rico, M.: "Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public 
services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities" 
2008/7. Sanromà, E.; Ramos, R.; Simón, H.: "Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. 
Evidencia para España" 
2008/8. Trillas, F.: "Regulatory federalism in network industries" 
 
2009 
 
2009/1. Rork, J.C.; Wagner, G.A.: "Reciprocity and competition: is there a connection?" 
2009/2. Mork, E.; Sjögren, A.; Svaleryd, H.: "Cheaper child care, more children" 
2009/3. Rodden, J.: "Federalism and inter-regional redistribution" 
2009/4. Ruggeri, G.C.: "Regional fiscal flows: measurement tools" 
2009/5. Wrede, M.: "Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization" 
2009/6. Jametti, M.; von Ungern-Sternberg, T.: "Risk selection in natural disaster insurance" 
2009/7. Solé-Ollé, A; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: does Spain 
behave differently?" 
2009/8. Sanromá, E.; Ramos, R.; Simón, H.: "Immigration wages in the Spanish Labour Market: Does the origin of 
human capital matter?" 
2009/9. Mohnen, P.; Lokshin, B.: "What does it take for and R&D incentive policy to be effective?" 
2009/10. Solé-Ollé, A.; Salinas, P..: "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain?" 
2009/11. Libman, A.; Feld, L.P.: "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The case of Russia" 
2009/12. Falck, O.; Fritsch, M.; Heblich, S.: "Bohemians, human capital, and regional economic growth" 
2009/13. Barrio-Castro, T.; García-Quevedo, J.: "The determinants of university patenting: do incentives matter?" 
2009/14. Schmidheiny, K.; Brülhart, M.: "On the equivalence of location choice models: conditional logit, nested 
logit and poisson" 
2009/15. Itaya, J., Okamuraz, M., Yamaguchix, C.: "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting" 
2009/16. Ens, P.: "Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal" 
2009/17. Geys, B., Revelli, F.: "Decentralization, competition and the local tax mix: evidence from Flanders" 
2009/18. Konrad, K., Kovenock, D.: "Competition for fdi with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages" 
2009/19. Loretz, S., Moorey, P.: "Corporate tax competition between firms" 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2009/20. Akai, N., Sato, M.: "Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership 
model with saving and free mobility" 
2009/21. Buzzacchi, L., Turati, G.: "Collective risks in local administrations: can a private insurer be better than a 
public mutual fund?" 
2009/22. Jarkko, H.: "Voluntary pension savings: the effects of the finnish tax reform on savers’ behaviour" 
2009/23. Fehr, H.; Kindermann, F.: "Pension funding and individual accounts in economies with life-cyclers and 
myopes" 
2009/24. Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "(Uncontrolled) Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidence 
from gasoline and cigarettes" 
2009/25. Goodspeed, T.; Haughwout, A.: "On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation" 
2009/26. Porto, E.; Revelli, F.: "Central command, local hazard and the race to the top" 
2009/27. Piolatto, A.: "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters’ representativeness" 
2009/28. Roeder, K.: "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents" 
2009/29, Porcelli, F.: "Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability on government efficiency 
evidence from the Italian health care sector" 
2009/30, Troumpounis, O.: "Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count" 
2009/31, Mejer, M., Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.: "Economic incongruities in the European patent system" 
2009/32, Solé-Ollé, A.: "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure  investment: tactical or programmatic?" 
2009/33, Joanis, M.: "Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California" 
2009/34, Parcero, O.J.: "Optimal country’s policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between 
firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies" 
2009/35, Cordero, J,M.; Pedraja, F.; Salinas, J.: "Efficiency measurement in the Spanish cadastral units through 
DEA" 
2009/36, Fiva, J.; Natvik, G.J.: "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?" 
2009/37, Haupt, A.; Krieger, T.: "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition" 
2009/38, Viladecans-Marsal, E; Arauzo-Carod, J.M.: "Can a knowledge-based cluster be created? The case of the 
Barcelona 22@district" 
 
2010 
 
2010/1, De Borger, B., Pauwels, W.: "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls 
and investment in serial transport corridors" 
2010/2, Chirinko, R.; Wilson, D.: "Can Lower Tax Rates Be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking And Tax Competition 
Among U.S. States" 
2010/3, Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "Politics or mobility? Evidence from us excise taxation" 
2010/4, Roehrs, S.; Stadelmann, D.: "Mobility and local income redistribution" 
2010/5, Fernández Llera, R.; García Valiñas, M.A.: "Efficiency and elusion: both sides of public enterprises in 
Spain" 
2010/6, González Alegre, J.: "Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental grants: the European regional policy 
and Spanish autonomous regions" 
2010/7, Jametti, M.; Joanis, M.: "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects" 
2010/8, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Should tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?" 
2010/9, Cubel, M.: "Fiscal equalization and political conflict" 
2010/10, Di Paolo, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Calero, J.: "Exploring educational mobility in Europe" 
2010/11, Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J.: "Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability" 
2010/12, Arqué Castells, P.: "Venture capital and innovation at the firm level" 
2010/13, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Polo-Otero, J.: "Which firms want PhDS? The effect of the 
university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market" 
Fiscal Federalism 
